Editing P2p mobile carriers (section)

== 12.6. Detecting contract breach by a buyer (continued) ==

While trusted computing and insurance offer good safe guards against abuse, its still recommended that sellers take the time to lock-down their plans by disabling any obvious features of abuse (e.g. premium SMS / calls, group calls / roaming, international, etc.)

The risk of abuse is less when a plans resources are being sold to the same buyer. Because by convention, the buyer must be able to fully pay for the resources so their escrow will always have enough to cover the cost of service. It’s only when resources start to be divided between different buyers that you run into problems.

Consider a seller provisioning resources to multiple buyers. Each buyer is only going to pay for the resources they’re interested in. So a malicious buyer who is able to bypass a secure processor can consume resources reserved for other buyers. And who should pay the cost if insurance wasn’t included in the contract? The other buyers haven’t done anything wrong.

One safe-guard to put in place might be to have GSM I/O go through a randomly selected node that acts as a packet notary. These notaries will only relay ciphered GSM packets if the first N bytes don’t match a certain pattern. They will also record the meta-data for ciphered responses from the network which can be audited to check for TID reallocation. Notaries don’t need to see a full conversation, only a small portion of each packet, and they would also hide a buyers location from the VLR as a cool bonus.

'''The following sections list a few contract examples'''

<span id="a-contract-for-faster-internet-speed"></span>