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Decentralized-virus-scanner

From Matthews Lab
Revision as of 05:06, 3 January 2025 by Robertsdotpm (talk | contribs) (Created page with "A game of war for decentralized threat detection: * One side plays the attacker * The other side plays defence * The field is a virtual machine * The ombudsman is software that monitors the VMs health * The ombudsman is concerned with what has happened to the VM * Are key system files damaged? * Have files been locked / crypted by malware? * Are certain network resources hijacked? * Attackers submit vectors to disrupt the VM * Defenders submit vectors to protect the VM...")
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A game of war for decentralized threat detection:

  • One side plays the attacker
  • The other side plays defence
  • The field is a virtual machine
  • The ombudsman is software that monitors the VMs health
  • The ombudsman is concerned with what has happened to the VM
  • Are key system files damaged?
  • Have files been locked / crypted by malware?
  • Are certain network resources hijacked?
  • Attackers submit vectors to disrupt the VM
  • Defenders submit vectors to protect the VM
  • False positive and negative problem: design the ombudsman to accept random nonce values that impact the tests, i.e. measure performance at date stamp X rather than at a fixed date each time.
  • Statistically validity becomes more apparent over time.
  • Reward function is yet unknown: but it could be a dividend system based on stopping or evading vectors – I find the potential here fascinating
  • I should note because the ombudsman can observe the result, it becomes objective in nature (like a true consensus system), and objective, goal-driven systems make for good cryptocurrencies
  • Resulting cryptocurrency becomes an emergent virus scanner
  • Security researchers could collaboratively update the ombudsman too based on reputation + stake-holder approval.
  • Alternatively, the standard hard fork model would also work