Harassment markets

Disclaimer: The following discussion is purely theoretical and should not be taken as an endorsement of illegal activities. It is written as a starting point to understand how criminal activity—beyond vending drugs on the deep web—might be organized. These models can help inform how legislation and law enforcement responses evolve to stay ahead of such crimes.

Introduction

The Internet famously reveals the darker side of humanity. Under the veil of anonymity, people can become anyone they want, often doing things online they would never do in real life. While anonymity is crucial for privacy, security, and free speech, it also makes policing far more difficult. In this context, privacy-enhancing technologies have been used to bypass laws. One notorious example is Silk Road, a revolutionary marketplace for all kinds of goods and services—drugs being its main commodity, though it also sold other items (even hot sauce).

Trust and Reputation Systems

A popular notion has long circulated that “hit men” operate on the deep web, feeding the myth that the dark web enables any kind of criminal activity, regardless of practicality. While the idea isn’t entirely absurd, it’s important to “walk before running.”

The Trust Problem
Suppose there’s a website advertising a hit man. The cost for a “hit” must be very high to justify the penalty of getting caught. But how does anyone trust the person offering this service? Historically, reputation systems (as seen on Silk Road) can solve complex trust issues. On Silk Road, untrusted sellers built reputations by offering small “sample” orders, limiting buyers’ risk and incentivizing honest transactions.

Micro-Transactions as a Gateway
In drug markets, you can buy micro-quantities, risking minimal cash while verifying a vendor’s reliability. My own decentralized exchange operated on a similar principle, using incremental micro-payments and escrow. If one side failed to continue a trade, there was no net profit in scamming. Silk Road also used escrow deposits, destroying funds if the deal went sour—an elegant game-theory approach to deter fraud.

The Indivisibility of “One Big Job”

The hit man example lacks this micro-transaction advantage. Murder isn’t divisible into smaller “sample tasks.” If a would-be assassin needs to commit a hit just to prove legitimacy, they’re risking a major crime from the outset. Publishing evidence of carrying out a murder is both self-incriminating and risky.

Prediction Markets?
Some suggest using prediction markets—like placing a bet on “Alice dies in February” and controlling the outcome. However, this creates a public threat and heightens the chance of being caught. It also requires meeting specific conditions (the exact month, for instance), making the job more complex. Thus, building a reputation for contract killing is not as straightforward as it is for selling small drug samples.

Harassment Markets

Before a “hit man” service can become credible, a stepping stone might be a marketplace for lesser crimes—harassment services. Picture a site where vendors offer everything from sending glitter bombs to more destructive acts like keying a car or throwing a brick through a window.

Escalating Reputation
Vendors could start by providing minor harassment services. As they gain positive reputation, customers might trust them with riskier requests. Eventually, a genuinely violent service could emerge from someone who’s proven themselves through anti-social acts.

Demand for Revenge
Many people feel wronged and never get justice through official channels. The appeal of paying someone for revenge is significant. A well-built reputation system and marketplace could theoretically enable such a business model—though it hasn’t yet emerged in a legitimate capacity.

Current Reality: Scams and Honey Pots

A workable reputation system costs both time and money to build, and right now, every supposed “hit man” site appears to be either a scam or a law enforcement sting (honey pot). From an economic standpoint, it’s more sensible for scammers to take payment and disappear than to risk murder charges for a single payout. The buyer can’t exactly go to the police. With no need for repeat business, burning bridges is inconsequential to the scammer.

Nevertheless, the Internet likely has the capacity to bootstrap a reputation system for a harassment market. All that’s missing is a determined founder with the technical and organizational skill to make it happen.

A “Potentially Positive” Side?

Could a marketplace for harassment make people behave better, knowing that anyone could anonymously pay for retaliation? The legal system is meant to enforce punishments for lawbreakers, but in reality, it often favors those with wealth and the resources to navigate bureaucracy. People can end up bankrupt or stuck in endless court battles. Sometimes, the system even gets weaponized to bully those with lesser means.

Double-Edged Sword
A harassment market could be seen as a form of extralegal justice: a way for the disenfranchised to punish wrongdoers. But it also lowers the cost of harassing anyone—even innocent people. This dilemma echoes gun control arguments: yes, guns can deter aggression, but they also enable it.

Chaotic Spiral
If a person is harassed, they might guess the culprit incorrectly, escalating conflict. Minor grievances could spiral as more people rush online for payback. Without formal checks or balances, it’s hard to predict overall societal impact.

Lessons from Silk Road

Silk Road used Tor for anonymity and Bitcoin for (pseudo-)anonymous payments, which seemed foolproof. But its fundamental weakness was a central hierarchy—one founder at the top, a single server hosting the site. When law enforcement targeted Dread Pirate Roberts, the entire marketplace collapsed. Hierarchies can be a security vulnerability: take down the top, and the rest crumbles.

Enter DAOs
A decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) could, in theory, govern a marketplace without a single kingpin. A blockchain enforces rules across many untrusted nodes, distributing power. For a harassment or illicit marketplace, a DAO model might muddy the waters of prosecution as no single person would be “in charge.”

The Challenge of Open-Source Software

Most deep web markets run on a single server as a Tor hidden service. This structure is incompatible with the DAO vision, which requires no single point of failure. Typically, dark web marketplaces use custom, closed-source software to handle trust and escrow. It’s unclear whether open-source solutions exist that are advanced enough to run a deep web black market, let alone a DAO-based one.

Privacy and Data Management
Blockchains typically store data in public ledgers. A truly private marketplace would need advanced cryptographic techniques—mesh networks, data sharding, zero-knowledge proofs, multiparty computation, or confidential computing.

DAO as an Organizational Layer
A DAO would manage membership, listing rules, and dispute resolution. Interaction could occur via anonymity networks. Metadata could be hidden with zero-knowledge proofs, and innovative blockchains like Grin might one day support private smart contracts. Threshold cryptography could distribute power among DAO participants, minimizing individual liability.

Broader Reasons to Build This

The same extreme privacy model that could host illegal goods can also improve privacy for legal commerce, reduce barriers for small merchants, and give users greater control. Essentially, the requirements of a clandestine market—robust anonymity, censorship resistance, decentralized governance—could benefit legitimate uses as well, especially for those in repressive regimes or facing financial exclusion.

Lessons from Past Markets
Silk Road was run by one individual who faced deep penalties when caught. A future iteration might be run by a DAO, eliminating a single point of failure. Meanwhile, decentralized and privacy-focused technology keeps advancing.

Reality Check
People already commit harassment or worse for free; it’s just not organized. This post merely examines how such organization could emerge and how the technology might be applied—whether for dark motives or potentially legitimate aims.

Conclusion

A harassment marketplace or even a “hit man for hire” platform remains largely theoretical due to trust barriers, legal risks, and operational challenges. Yet the technology—blockchains, anonymity networks, reputation systems, decentralized governance, and advanced cryptography—all exist in nascent forms to make it possible. Beyond illicit goals, these same innovations promise more privacy, autonomy, and resilience for online commerce. Whether such a marketplace ever becomes a reality, it’s worth understanding the underlying concepts and preparing for the societal and legal ramifications that could follow.